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Singapore: A Mix of Traditional and New
Rules
Adeline Chong
1 The Treatment of Choice of Court Agreements in General
Singapore law evinces a strong respect for choice of court agreements. The policy in
favour of enforcing choice of court agreements as far as possible can be discerned
when considering how Singapore courts deal with choice of court agreements in the
jurisdictional context, both in terms of establishing the existence of jurisdiction and
on the exercise of jurisdiction. This policy extends not just to exclusive choice of
court agreements, but also optional choice of court agreements.1 Further, legislative
support for enforcing choice of court agreements is illustrated by the fact that
Singapore signed up to the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements
2005 (“HCCCA”) on 25th March 2015. The HCCCA is implemented into Singapore
law by the Choice of Court Agreements Act 2016 (“CCAA”),2 which entered into
force on 1st October 2016.
Choice of court agreements are normally categorised as being exclusive or
non-exclusive in nature. Use of the terminology of “optional choice of court
agreement” as a label for the latter type of agreement is uncommon in Singapore.
In general terms, parties are free to contract for any jurisdiction of their choice.
However, enforcement of the choice of court agreement must not be against the
fundamental public policy of Singapore. For example, it is possible that a foreign
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“Jurisdiction agreements, though they may be [optional] in nature, should be respected and, when
possible, upheld”: PT Jaya Putra Kundur Indah v Guthrie Overseas Investments Pte Ltd [1996]
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choice of court agreement will be ignored if parties deliberately chose the foreign
forum to evade the operation of the Unfair Contract Terms Act.3
Two recent developments have had an impact on the legal treatment of choice of
court agreements. The ﬁrst is the enactment of the HCCCA into Singapore law. The
HCCCA has as its aim making exclusive choice of court agreements legally effective
from the jurisdictional and recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments
aspects. The second is the establishment of the Singapore International Commercial
Court (“SICC”) on 5th January 2015. The SICC is a division of the Singapore High
Court4 which specialises in actions which are international and commercial in
nature. As will be seen below, traditional private international law rules are modiﬁed
when there is a choice of court agreement, whether exclusive or optional in nature, in
favour of the SICC.
While the Singapore courts do refer to decisions and developments in other
countries, these tend to be English and Commonwealth authorities. The rules
contained in the Brussels regime have not inﬂuenced Singapore law in any signif-
icant manner in this area of the law.5
2 Optional Choice of Court Agreements
2.1 Legal Sources
Statute and the common law are both relevant when one is trying to determine the
effect of optional choice of court agreements. The relevant statutory provisions are
mainly those which deal with the issue of the jurisdiction of the Singapore courts.
Depending on how the optional choice of court agreement is construed, the Recip-
rocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act6 may also be relevant. It should be
noted that Singapore did not avail itself of the option of extending the HCCCA to
optional choice of court agreements.7
3Cap 396, 1994 Rev Ed. This Act offers protection against certain types of exclusion and limitation
clauses.
4Unless the context provides otherwise, references to the “Singapore High Court” in this chapter
should be taken as references to the Singapore High Court excluding the SICC.
5Although, similarly to procedural rules which implement the Brussels regime in the UK (Civil
Procedure Rule 6.33(2)), no leave is required to serve a writ on a defendant abroad for a case
commenced before the Singapore International Commercial Court (SICC) regime. It is unclear if the
UK CPR provided the inspiration for this.
6Cap 265, 2001 Rev Ed. Speciﬁcally, section 5(3)(b) thereof. See below, text n 109 et seq.
7HCCCA, Article 22.
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2.2 Applicable Law
At common law, the issue of whether a choice of court agreement is optional or
exclusive in nature is one of construction of the agreement which is to be determined
by the proper law of the contract.8 In principle, the parties may choose one law to
govern the choice of court agreement, and another law to govern the rest of the
contract, but in practice this would be unusual. However, if this were to be the case,
the proper law of the choice of court agreement would apply to determine whether
the choice of court agreement is optional or exclusive in nature. The rest of the report
proceeds on the assumption that the parties have not split the proper law in this
manner.
Under Singapore law, there are three stages in determining what law governs a
contract.9 First, the court will determine if the parties have made an express choice of
law. If there is no express choice, the court will see if any intention of the parties as to
the governing law can be discerned by considering the circumstances of the case.10 If
no implied intention can be found, the court will lastly determine what is the law of
closest connection to the contract.11
Where an express choice of law has been made, “it is virtually conclusive of the
proper law governing the contract.”12 However, party autonomy is not unfettered:
any choice cannot be contrary to public policy and must be bona ﬁde and legal.13 A
choice is not bona ﬁde when the parties have chosen a law solely to evade the
provisions of another law.14 Further, it should be noted that ﬂoating choice of law
clauses are not valid as a matter of Singapore law.15
Singapore law could be the proper law of the contract on the basis of one of the
three stages above and therefore applicable to the issue of construction of the choice
8PT Jaya Putra Kundur Indah v Guthrie Overseas Investments Pte Ltd [1996] SGHC 285, [62].
9Paciﬁc Recreation Pte Ltd v S Y Technology Inc [2008] 2 SLR(R) 491.
10The list of factors was summarised in Las Vegas Hilton Corp v Khoo Teng Hock Sunny [1996]
2 SLR(R) 589, [39] as including: the language and terminology used, the form of documents
involved in the transaction, whether there is any connection with a prior transaction, the currency of
the contract or the currency for payment, the places of residence or business of the parties and the
commercial purpose of the transaction.
11The factors that are considered at this third stage are the same as those considered in the search for
an implied choice of law; however, while the weight attributed to speciﬁc factors may differ
according to the context, equal weight is to be placed on all factors at the third stage. See Paciﬁc
Recreation Pte Ltd v S Y Technology Inc [2008] 2 SLR(R) 491, [48].
12Peh Teck Quee v Bayerische Landesbank Girozentrale [1999] 3 SLR(R) 842, [17].
13Peh Teck Quee v Bayerische Landesbank Girozentrale [1999] 3 SLR(R) 842, [12].
14Peh Teck Quee v Bayerische Landesbank Girozentrale [1999] 3 SLR(R) 842, [17].
15Shanghai Turbo Enterprises Ltd v Liu Ming [2018] SGHC 172, [31]; overruled on another point
[2019] 1 SLR 779. It is ambiguous whether this is a statement of general principle applicable
irrespective of the proper law’s position on ﬂoating choice of law agreements, or conﬁned to
situations where Singapore law is the proper law of the contract: compare Shanghai Turbo
Enterprises Ltd v Liu Ming [2018] SGHC 172, [31] and [52]. The former is more persuasive.
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of court agreement. Alternatively, Singapore law could be the applicable law
because no proof of the foreign proper law of the contract has been tendered by
the parties.16 If Singapore law were to be the applicable law, use of the word
“exclusive” or “optional”, as the case may be, is not necessarily determinative.17
The Singapore courts’ approach towards contractual construction in general is that
while the text is of ﬁrst importance, both the text and the context of the contract must
be ascertained to determine the objective intentions of the parties.18
Special considerations arise if the choice of court agreement is in favour of the
SICC, or if the choice of court agreement is one which falls within the scope of the
CCAA. The approach taken under the SICC’s rules and under the CCAA represent a
departure from the common law approach, as both regimes rely on a presumption of
exclusivity.
Section 18F of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act19 provides:
(1) Subject to subsection (2), the parties to an agreement to submit to the jurisdiction of the
Singapore International Commercial Court shall be considered to have agreed-
(a) to submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Singapore International Commercial
Court;
(b) to carry out any judgment or order of the Singapore International Commercial Court
without undue delay; and
(c) to waive any recourse to any court or tribunal outside Singapore against any
judgment or order of the Singapore International Commercial Court, and against
the enforcement of such judgment or order, insofar as such recourse can be validly
waived.
(2) Subsection (1)(a), (b) and (c) applies only if there is no express provision to the contrary
in the agreement.
It is unclear whether the various presumptions set out in section 18F apply if the
proper law of the contract is not Singapore law. In other words, is section 18F a
forum mandatory rule? There are good grounds for arguing that the usual presump-
tion against extraterritorial legislation is rebutted as the SICC deals with
16E.g., as in Orchard Capital I Ltd v Ravindra Kumar Jhunjhunwala [2012] 2 SLR 519. This is on
the basis of the common law presumption of similarity between the lex fori and the applicable
foreign law if the content of the latter law is not proven.
17In PT Jaya Putra Kundur Indah v Guthrie Overseas Investments Pte Ltd [1996] SGHC 285, the
clause read: “Each of the parties to this Agreement hereby irrevocably and unconditionally submits
to the exclusive jurisdiction of the District Courts of Central Jakarta but without prejudice to the
right of any thereof to commence action or bring suit against each and every other party in any Court
having Jurisdiction but for this Section. . . . In relation to any proceedings in Singapore, . . .”. The
proper law of the agreement was Indonesian law but without helpful evidence on Indonesian law on
construction of the agreement, the court proceeded on the basis that Indonesian law on construction
of the agreement was the same as Singapore law. The High Court held that on normal Singapore
principles of construction, the clause was an optional choice of court agreement. See [1996] SGHC
285, [61]–[63].
18YES F&B Group Pte Ltd v Soup Restaurant Singapore Pte Ltd [2015] 5 SLR 1187; Yap Son On v
Ding Pei Zhen [2017] 1 SLR 219.
19Cap 322, Rev Ed 2007.
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international cases.20 Furthermore, this ties in with the situation when there is an
overlap between the SICC and the CCAA. If the choice of court agreement falls
within the scope of the CCAA, section 3(2) of the CCAA provides that the
agreement is deemed to be exclusive unless the parties to the agreement expressly
provide otherwise. Section 3(2) of the CCAA implements Article 3b) of the HCCCA
which Singapore, by signing up to the HCCCA, is obliged to carry into effect. There
is little doubt that the deeming provision of Article 3b) is intended to override the
usual canons of construction. Section 3(2) of the CCAA is thus a forum mandatory
rule. Hence, if the parties’ choice of the SICC as the forum for dispute resolution
falls within the scope of the CCAA, the presumption of exclusivity prevails regard-
less of the proper law of the contract.
Three points could be made which collectively set out a persuasive case that
section 18F of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act ought to be construed as a forum
mandatory rule: ﬁrst, the presumption against extraterritorial application is rebutted
as the SICC is set up to hear cases with international elements; secondly, Article 3b)
of the HCCCA, which has been transposed into section 3(2) of the CCAA, provided
the inspiration for section 18F(1)(a) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act21 and, as
argued above, is itself a forum mandatory rule; and thirdly, this makes for consis-
tency of approach between SICC/non-CCAA choice of court agreements and SICC/
CCAA choice of court agreements. All of these agreements will be presumed to be
exclusive regardless of the proper law of the contract.
However, the presumption of exclusivity will be rebutted under both the SICC
and the CCAA regimes if the parties have expressly provided to the contrary. It has
been argued that if the parties have expressly chosen another law to govern their
contract, this would qualify as an express provision against the presumption of
exclusivity of the forum.22 The effect of the argument is that section 18F would
remain applicable (on the assumption that it is a forum mandatory rule) if the parties
have not expressly chosen a law to govern the contract and the proper law in the
absence of an express choice, either on the basis that it is the parties’ implied choice
of law or the applicable law of the contract in the absence of choice, is the law of a
foreign country. This is because proper laws derived in this manner could not be said
to serve as “express provision(s) to the contrary” within the meaning of section 18F
(2) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act. The overall effect, that whether section
18F applies in a contract governed by a foreign law depends on whether the parties
have expressly chosen that foreign proper law or not, is arguably rather mercurial. It
cannot be justiﬁed as being in line with the SICC’s ethos of championing party
autonomy as the parties’ implied choice of a foreign law, which is also an exercise in
party autonomy, would not prevent section 18F from being superimposed onto the
contract. It is submitted that the preferable view is that a clearer expression of
dissent, rather than merely expressly choosing a foreign proper law, should be
required to rebut the presumption.
20Yeo (2015), para 22.
21Yeo (2015), para 36.
22Yeo (2015), para 22.
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Once it is determined that a choice of court agreement is optional in nature, its
legal effect, in the sense of determining what the parties have agreed to, is deter-
mined by the proper law of the contract. However, the effect of an optional choice of
court agreement on Singapore proceedings, whether Singapore is the named forum
or not, is purely a procedural matter to be governed by the lex fori.23
2.3 Optional Choice of Court Agreement for Singapore
2.3.1 Singapore High Court (Not Including the Singapore International
Commercial Court)
Non-SICC situations will ﬁrst be considered as different rules apply when the choice
of court agreement is for the SICC.
If there is an optional choice of court agreement in favour of Singapore, the courts
have held that the parties are taken to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the
Singapore courts.24 This contractual submission, coupled with proper service of the
Singapore writ, would found jurisdiction in the Singapore courts. If the choice of
court agreement stipulates a method of service within Singapore, service in accor-
dance with the contractual terms will confer jurisdiction on the Singapore courts.25 If
the choice of court agreement is silent on how service is to be effected or provides for
a method of service outside of Singapore, leave will have to be obtained from the
court to serve the writ on a defendant who is abroad.26 The plaintiff will have to
show27:
(a) a good arguable case28 that his or her claim falls within one of the heads of Order
11 of the Rules of Court;
(b) a serious issue to be tried on the merits; and
(c) Singapore is forum conveniens.
23Abdul Rashid bin Abdul Manaf v Hii Yii Ann [2014] 4 SLR 1042, [12].
24Astrata (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Portcullis Escrow Pte Ltd [2011] 3 SLR 386.
25Rules of Court, Order 10, rule 3.
26Of course, service can be effected within Singapore if the defendant is present in Singapore, but
the basis of service within jurisdiction in this instance will be the presence of the defendant and not
the optional choice of court agreement.
27Bradley Lomas Elektrolok Ltd v Colt Ventilation East Asia Pte Ltd [1999] 3 SLR(R) 1156. The
speciﬁc procedural rules are set out in the Rules of Court, Order 11, rule 2.
28This requires the applicant to have “the better of the argument”: Shanghai Turbo Enterprises Ltd v
Liu Ming [2019] 1 SLR 779, [49].
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Order 11 rule 1(r)29 and, speciﬁcally for contractual claims, rule (1)(d)(iv),30 are
the heads of Order 11 that can be relied upon by the plaintiff. The forum conveniens
(and forum non conveniens) test which applies in Singapore is that set out in Spiliada
Maritime Corporation v Cansulex Ltd (“Spiliada”).31
The court retains a discretion to stay proceedings or to set aside service of a writ
abroad even if it had assumed jurisdiction on the basis of an optional choice of court
agreement in its favour. Until recently, the impact of an express or implied waiver of
objection to the jurisdiction of the Singapore court in the choice of court agreement
was unclear. A fortiori whether a waiver was to be presumed into the optional choice
of court agreement. For example, in Transocean Offshore International Ventures Ltd
v Burgundy Global Exploration Corp,32 an optional choice of court agreement for
Singapore which included an express waiver of objection33 was held to be akin to an
exclusive jurisdiction clause such that the defendant seeking a stay of the Singapore
proceedings had to establish exceptional circumstances amounting to “strong cause”
why he should be allowed to breach the agreement.34 This is a higher threshold than
the Spiliada test. However, the Singapore High Court in UBS AG v Telesto Invest-
ments Ltd35 applied the Spiliada test to a similarly constituted agreement for
Singapore which included an express waiver of objection to Singaporean proceed-
ings. The court cautioned that the line between exclusive and optional choice of
court agreements should not be blurred.36 The balance of authority supported the
UBS AG position, where the optional choice of court agreement is a factor to be
weighed in determination of which is the “clearly and distinctly more appropriate
forum.”37
29
“the claim is in respect of matters in which the defendant has submitted or agreed to submit to the
jurisdiction of the Court”.
30
“the claim is brought to enforce, rescind, dissolve, annul or otherwise affect a contract, or to
recover damages or obtain other relief in respect of the breach of a contract, being (in either case) a
contract which . . . contains a term to the effect that that Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and
determine any action in respect of the contract.”
31[1987] AC 460. This test is elaborated below, see text to n 88 et seq. See also JIO Minerals FZC v
Mineral Enterprises Ltd [2011] 1 SLR 391, [45]–[52], where the Court of Appeal rejected the
Australian “clearly inappropriate forum” test.
32[2010] 2 SLR 821.
33The relevant sub-clause provided: “Each of the parties irrevocably waives any objection it may
now or in the future have to the venue of any action or proceedings, and any claim it may now or in
the future have that the action or proceeding has been brought in an inconvenient forum.” See
[2010] 2 SLR 821, [12] (emphasis in judgment).
34This test is elaborated below, see text to n 53–62. See also Societe Generale v Tai Kee Sing @ Tai
Hean Sing [2003] SGHC 139 (“strong cause” test applied even though, from the face of the
judgment, it appears that the clause did not include a waiver of objection to jurisdiction).
35[2011] 4 SLR 503.
36[2011] 4 SLR 503, [120].
37Industrial & Commercial Bank Limited v Banco Ambrosiano Veneto S.P.A. [2000] SGHC 188;
UBS AG v Telesto Investments Ltd [2011] 4 SLR 503; Dinesh Kishin Kikla v The Hong Kong and
Shanghai Banking Corporation Ltd [2013] SGHCR 06 (High Court Registry). In Asia-Paciﬁc
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However, the law in this area has been revised by the recent decision of the Court
of Appeal in Shanghai Turbo Enterprises Ltd v Liu Ming (“Shanghai Turbo”).38 The
optional choice of court agreement was in these terms: “[E]ach of the parties hereto
submits to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of the Courts of Singapore/or People’s
Republic of China.” The Court of Appeal held that where the proper law of the
contract is Singapore law and Singapore is a named forum in the optional choice of
court agreement, the defendant must show “strong cause” why he should not be
bound to his contractual agreement to submit to the Singapore court’s jurisdiction.
This means that a presumption that the parties have agreed not to object to the
exercise of jurisdiction by the Singapore court will be read into the agreement.
In holding that the “strong cause” test applies to optional choice of court
agreements for the Singapore court, the Court of Appeal in Shanghai Turbo has
clariﬁed the state of the Singapore law on this issue. The court’s position in Shanghai
Turbo can be contrasted with its earlier decision inOrchard Capital I Ltd v Ravindra
Kumar Jhunjhunwala (“Orchard Capital”).39 Drawing on work done by Professor
Yeo Tiong Min,40 the Court of Appeal in Orchard Capital had canvassed two
possible strands of analysis that could be taken in relation to optional choice of
court agreements. First, a contractual analysis could be taken where it could be
implied that the parties had undertook that the chosen court is the most appropriate
forum so that it would be a breach of contract for one of the parties to argue that some
other court should hear the case.41 The second strand of analysis is general in nature:
an optional choice of court agreement is a factor to be applied in all cases pursuant to
the Spiliada principles.42 Under the general analysis, the weight to be attached to the
optional choice of court agreement would depend on the facts and circumstances
concerned; there was “no magic formula as such”.43 The court in Orchard Capital
appeared to prefer the second strand of analysis, noting that the contractual approach
may be impractical to apply at an interlocutory stage and could lead to uncertainty.44
While it could be said that the contractual approach is a principled one, it ran the risk
Ventures II Ltd v PT Intimutiara Basindo [2001] 2 SLR(R) 371, [22] the court cited Dicey and
Morris on the Conﬂict of Laws (13th ed, 2000) to the effect that pursuant to the test in Spiliada, in
principle, it is not open to either party to object to the court’s exercise of its jurisdiction on grounds
which should have been foreseeable when the agreement was made. However, the court did not
appear to apply this prohibition in its analysis of the facts.
38[2019] 1 SLR 779.
39[2012] 2 SLR 519.
40Yeo (2005).
41The Court of Appeal cautioned that it by no means wholeheartedly accepted the contractual
approach: [2012] 2 SLR 519, [26].
42Emphasis in original: [2012] 2 SLR 519, [25].
43[2012] 2 SLR 519, [31].
44The court also did not have to grapple with the contractual analysis as it had not been raised by the
parties, and further, the court held that the parties had not intended the particular agreement in the
case to have a signiﬁcant effect: see [2012] 2 SLR 519, [27].
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of effacing the distinction between optional and exclusive choice of court
agreements.45
However, in Shanghai Turbo, it is clearly the case that the Court of Appeal
embraced the contractual strand of analysis. It observed that the court in Orchard
Capital did not have to decide whether the contractual strand ought to apply as it had
not been raised by the parties46 but that the very issue was presently before the
court.47 It held that the meaning of the word “submit” in the optional choice of court
agreement is that “the parties consent to the exercise of jurisdiction by the courts of
that forum and waive any objection thereto. . .”.48 Five points ought to be noted.
First, despite the focus on the word “submit” in the clause at hand, the court referred
to a number of English cases where the optional choice of court agreements were
variously worded in support of its decision. Thus, it appears that the presumption of a
waiver of objection will apply even if the optional choice of court agreement does
not expressly refer to the parties “submitting” to the jurisdiction of the Singapore
court.49 Secondly, the court adopted the contractual strand of analysis notwithstand-
ing that the clause concerned was an optional choice of court agreement which
named another court in addition to the Singapore court. Thus, the court stated that
any challenge to the exercise of jurisdiction of the Singapore court, whether in the
context of an application to set aside an order granting the plaintiff leave to serve the
writ out of jurisdiction, or to stay the Singapore proceedings in favour of proceedings
abroad would require the defendant to show “strong cause” why he ought to be
allowed to break the contractual bargain. Signiﬁcantly, the court stated that this is so
even if the defendant applies to stay the proceedings in favour of a jurisdiction which
is also named in the optional choice of court agreement.50 Thirdly, the court noted
that its analysis only applied to “paradigmatic” optional choice of court agreements
such as that in the present case and “should not be applied unthinkingly to jurisdic-
tion clauses which do not have the same legal effect.”51 Thus, if party intentions are
clearly expressed, the presumption will not apply. Fourthly, this presumption of a
waiver against objecting to the exercise of jurisdiction by the court only applies
insofar as Singapore law, or a law with similar construction of contract principles, is
the proper law of the contract. Of course, in the absence of proof of foreign law, the
presumption of similarity with Singapore law will apply. Fifthly, if the defendant
brings an anti-suit injunction restraining the plaintiff from seising the Singapore
court, there would be a breach of contract by the defendant. If the plaintiff in turn
sought an anti-anti-suit injunction from the Singapore court to restrain the foreign
45Orchard Capital [2012] 2 SLR 519, [24].
46Orchard Capital [2012] 2 SLR 519, [27].
47Shanghai Turbo [2019] 1 SLR 779, [80].
48[2019] 1 SLR 779, [84] (emphasis in original).
49For example, the clause provides that: “The contract is subject to the jurisdiction of the Singapore
court.” See [2019] 1 SLR 779, [89].
50[2019] 1 SLR 779, [86].
51[2019] 1 SLR 779, [83].
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anti-suit application, the defendant would have to show “strong cause” why the anti-
anti-suit injunction should not be granted.52
The “strong cause” test articulated in Shanghai Turbo normally applies to
exclusive choice of court agreements outside the context of the SICC and the
CCAA. The burden of proof is on the person breaking the agreement. The court in
exercising its discretion on whether to grant a stay may have regard to the following
matters:
(a) In what country the evidence on the issues of fact is situated or more readily available,
and the effect of that on the relative convenience and expense of trial as between the
Singapore and foreign courts.
(b) Whether the law of the foreign court applies and, if so, whether it differs from Singapore
law in any material respects.
(c) With what country either party is connected and, if so, how closely.
(d) Whether the defendants genuinely desire trial in the foreign country, or are only seeking
procedural advantages.
(e) Whether the plaintiffs would be prejudiced by having to sue in the foreign court because
they would:
(i) be deprived of security for their claim;
(ii) be unable to enforce any judgment obtained;
(iii) be faced with a time bar not applicable here; or
(iv) for political, racial, religious or other reasons be unlikely to get a fair trial.53
The factors above are culled from The Eleftheria.54 However, in Vinmar Over-
seas (Singapore) Pte Ltd v PTT International Trading Pte Ltd,55 the Court of Appeal
observed that the wording of factor (d) above was infelicitous as it suggests that:
(a) the applicant’s subjective desire for trial would be a relevant consideration when
it is not; and (b) it is improper for the applicant to seek procedural advantages in
applying for a stay when there is nothing wrong with a party seeking the procedural
advantages of an agreed forum.56 In an earlier case, The “Jian He”,57 the fact that
the defendant did not have a genuine defence on the merits of the claim had been
determinative in the refusal of a stay on grounds that the defendant is not really
interested in trial in the agreed forum but is merely seeking a procedural advantage.
The court in Vinmar decisively overruled the Jian He position by holding that the
merits of the case or lack thereof should not be a relevant consideration in the “strong
cause” test. It stated that factor (d) should instead be interpreted as capturing the
inquiry: “is the applicant acting abusively in applying for a stay of proceedings?”58
52See below, text following n 103.
53Vinmar Overseas (Singapore) Pte Ltd v PTT International Trading Pte Ltd [2018] 2 SLR
1271, [71].
54[1969] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 237.
55[2018] 2 SLR 1271.
56[2018] 2 SLR 1271, [130].
57[1999] 3 SLR(R) 432.
58[2018] 2 SLR 1271, [130].
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The above factors were formulated where the Singapore proceedings are com-
menced in breach of a choice of court agreement for a foreign court. Where the
Singapore proceedings are in line with an optional choice of court agreement for
Singapore and it is the defendant who is applying to set aside or stay the proceedings,
the Eleftheria factors will have to be adapted. The defendant who is relying on factor
(d) would have to show that the plaintiff’s conduct in commencing the Singapore
proceedings is abusive.59 Factor (e) would require showing that the defendant would
be prejudiced by having to defend in Singapore.60 It might be observed that the
defendant would be hard pressed to make the last point.
The above list is not a closed one.61 Further, foreseeable factors, that is, factors
known to the parties at the time the agreement was made, will be given less weight
compared to unforeseeable factors.62
2.3.2 Singapore International Commercial Court
If the optional choice of court agreement is in favour of the SICC,63 leave need not
be obtained to serve the writ outside of Singapore on a party to the written
jurisdiction agreement.64 This is a move away from the traditional notion of service
out as being exorbitant in nature.65 While under the traditional rules, service has a
jurisdiction founding function, it can be said that under the SICC framework, service
serves a notiﬁcation function, i.e., to notify parties of the proceedings.66
The test for a stay application also differs from the traditional rules under the
SICC framework. According to Order 110, rule 8 of the Rules of Court:
(1) Subject to paragraph (2), the Court may decline to assume jurisdiction . . . if it is not
appropriate for the action to be heard in the Court.
(2) The Court must not decline to assume jurisdiction in an action solely on the ground that
the dispute between the parties is connected to a jurisdiction other than Singapore, if
there is a written jurisdiction agreement between the parties.
(3) In exercising its discretion under paragraph (1), the Court shall have regard to its
international and commercial character.
59Shanghai Turbo [2019] 1 SLR 779, [95].
60Shanghai Turbo [2019] 1 SLR 779, [95].
61Trisuryo Garuda Nusa Pte Ltd v SKP Pradiksi [2017] 2 SLR 814, [85] and [90].
62Golden Shore Transportation Pte Ltd v UCO Bank [2004] 1 SLR(R) 6, [38]; The “Hyundai
Fortune” [2004] 4 SLR(R) 548, [30]; Vinmar Overseas (Singapore) Pte Ltd v PTT International
Trading Pte Ltd [2018] 2 SLR 1271, [72] and [112].
63If the optional choice of court agreement is in favour of the “Singapore High Court” and the
agreement is concluded on or after 1 October 2016, Order 110, rule 1(2)(ca) of the Rules of Court
provides that the agreement is to be construed as including an agreement to the jurisdiction of the
SICC, unless a contrary intention appears in the agreement. The SICC is a division of the Singapore
High Court.
64Rules of Court, Order 110, rule 6(2).
65Cf. Abela v Baadarani [2013] UKSC 44, [2013] 1 WLR 2043, [53].
66See further Chong and Yip (2019), pp. 109–110.
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It is clear that the test set out in Order 110 rule 8(1) is an eschewing of the
Spiliada test and is intended to operate more strictly to the question of when
jurisdiction may be declined by the SICC. The “not appropriate” test has been
interpreted by the High Court Registry67 to oblige the SICC to apply the
Australian “clearly inappropriate forum” test.68 There are grounds to doubt this.69
It is more likely that the drafters intended the “not appropriate” forum test to be
autonomous in nature.70
2.3.3 Parallel Proceedings Abroad and Anti-suit Injunctions
An optional choice of court agreement for Singapore does not restrict the parties’
right to pursue proceedings in other jurisdictions. It has been said in the context of an
application for an anti-suit injunction that a multiplicity of proceedings is not
presumed to be vexatious.71 However, the courts’ approach towards the grant of
an anti-suit injunction restraining foreign proceedings differs according to whether
Singapore proceedings have or have not been commenced pursuant to an optional
Singapore choice of court agreement. It has been held that “the court should be slow
to grant an anti-suit injunction where there is no existing lis in Singapore.”72
2.4 Optional Choice of Court Agreement for a Foreign Court
In Shanghai Turbo, the Court of Appeal held that if the optional choice of court
agreement were for a foreign court and Singapore is the proper law of the contract,
the defendant may apply for a stay or to set aside service of the writ on the basis that
Singapore is forum non conveniens. In other words, there is no breach of contract
and the Spiliada test applies where the optional choice of court agreement is but one
factor to be weighed in the Spiliada exercise. This is in line with previous decisions
on foreign optional choice of court agreements.
In PT Jaya Putra Kundur Indah v Guthrie Overseas Investments Pte Ltd,73 the
High Court interpreted an optional choice of court agreement for Indonesia to mean
that prima facie, the parties had agreed that Indonesia would be an appropriate forum
67IM Skaugen SE v MAN Diesel & Turbo SE [2016] SGHCR 6, overruled, without consideration of
this point [2018] SGHC 123.
68Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd (1991) 65 ALJR 83.
69Yeo (2015), para 32.
70See further, Yeo (2015), paras 27–34; Yip (2016), pp. 456–460.
71UBS AG v Telesto Investments Ltd [2011] 4 SLR 503, [119].
72Morgan Stanley Asia (Singapore) Pte (formerly known as Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Asia
(Singapore) Pte) v Hong Leong Finance Ltd [2013] 3 SLR 409, [71].
73[1996] SGHC 285.
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and the plaintiffs should not be heard to argue that it would not be an appropriate
forum for trial of the action.74 However, despite this, the applicable test was not
“strong cause”, rather, Lai J considered the optional choice of court agreement for
Indonesia to be a factor, albeit a strong one, in the Spiliada test.75 This can be
explained on the basis that the parties only agreed that Indonesia was an appropriate
forum and it would not be a breach of contract to argue that Singapore is a more
appropriate forum.76
The modern preference of Singapore courts to adopt a general analysis in relation
to foreign optional choice of court agreements is also illustrated by the Singapore
High Court decision of Abdul Rashid bin Abdul Manaf v Hii Yii Ann (‘Hii Yii Ann’)77
which involved an optional choice of court agreement for the courts of Queensland.
InHii Yii Ann, the court contrasted an optional choice of court agreement (referred to
as a non-exclusive jurisdiction clause, or “NEJ”), which denotes “an” appropriate
jurisdiction, with a “most appropriate jurisdiction” agreement (“MAJ”), which
denotes “the” appropriate jurisdiction. While the court accepted that the use of the
word “non-exclusive” in the choice of court agreement did not always mean that it
was the former type of clause and not the latter, it favoured giving an ordinary
meaning to the word “non-exclusive”. Woo J stated:
. . . if a negotiated NEJ clause amounts to an MAJ clause in substance so that the evidential
burden shifts to a plaintiff suing in the non-contractual jurisdiction to show strong cause as to
why he should be permitted to do so, this will bring the negotiated NEJ clause very close to
an EJ clause. Indeed, one may even ask whether there is then any practical difference
between a negotiated NEJ clause and an EJ clause because even for an EJ clause, a plaintiff
may still show strong cause why he should be permitted to bring an action in a jurisdiction
which is not the contractual one. . . .78
Woo J proceeded to apply the usual Spiliada principles, under which the optional
choice of court agreement was but one factor to be considered in the balancing
exercise. However, the learned judge also accepted that whether the clause could be
something more than “an” appropriate choice of court agreement would depend on
the context and the rest of the terms.79
In sum, an optional choice of court agreement in favour of a foreign court will
usually be a factor within the Spiliada analysis. That said, if the wording of the
choice of court agreement and circumstances of the case indicate that the parties
intend an optional choice of court agreement to be more than what it would be in the
74[1996] SGHC 285, [64].
75Lai J expressly rejected the approach suggested by Waller J in British Aerospace v Dee Howard
[1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 368, 375–377, under which factors which are eminently foreseeable at the
time they entered into the contract cannot be relied upon by the parties in the context of the Spiliada
test, particularly if the choice of court agreement was freely negotiated and is an express term of a
detailed agreement.
76Yeo (2005), para 81.
77[2014] 4 SLR 1042.
78[2014] 4 SLR 1042, [54].
79[2014] 4 SLR 1042, [53].
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ordinary case, the courts would honour party intentions. For example, in Bambang
Sutrisno v Bali International Finance Ltd,80 the optional choice of court agreement
was for the Indonesian courts. However, the plaintiff reserved the right to sue the
defendant in any other competent court in any other jurisdiction and the defendant
agreed to waive any objections on the ground of venue or forum non conveniens or
any similar grounds. Thus, when the plaintiff commenced Singapore proceedings,
the defendant was put to “strong cause” why a stay should be allowed, given that the
waiver portion of the agreement was not conﬁned merely to proceedings before the
Indonesian courts.81
It should lastly be noted that if proceedings have been commenced in the
nominated foreign court, the existence of parallel proceedings would also be a factor
that the court would weigh in the Spiliada analysis.
2.5 Comparison Between Forum and Foreign Optional
Choice of Court Agreements
If the optional choice of court agreement is for the SICC, it is evident that a different
approach is taken compared to optional choice of court agreements for a foreign
court. The applicable test on a stay application for the SICC is the arguably
autonomous “not appropriate” forum test.82
Outside of the SICC, it is established after Shanghai Turbo that different
approaches would be taken for foreign and forum optional choice of court agree-
ments insofar as Singapore law, or a law with similar principles of construction,
apply to the contract.83 Where Singapore is the named forum or one of the named
fora in the optional choice of court agreement, the defendant who is resisting trial in
Singapore will have to show “strong cause” as he is breaching the presumption of
waiver of objection to the Singapore court’s jurisdiction. Conversely, where a
foreign court is named, no breach of contract is presumed upon commencement of
Singapore proceedings. The foreign optional choice of court agreement is a factor in
the Spiliada test. In other words, optional choice of court agreements for the forum
would be treated more favourably compared to optional choice of court agreements
for a foreign court.84
80[1999] 2 SLR(R) 632.
81See also Baiduri Bank Bhd v Dong Sui Hung [2000] 2 SLR(R) 271. Cf.OCBC Capital Investment
Asia Ltd v Wong Hua Choon [2010] 4 SLR 904, where the optional choice of court agreement was
for Malaysia and coupled with a waiver of objection on grounds of inconvenient forum. On
construction of the agreement, it was held that the waiver portion only applied to proceedings
before the Malaysian court. Hence the Spiliada test was applied to the stay application.
82Rules of Court, Order 110, rule 8(1).
83The Court endorsed the Hong Kong Court of Appeal decision of Noble Power Investments Ltd v
Nissei Stomach Tokyo Co Ltd [2008] 5 HKLRD 631.
84Cf. Hii Yii Ann [2014] 4 SLR 1042, [25]–[26] and [49].
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2.6 Weaker Parties
In Vinmar Overseas (Singapore) Pte Ltd v PTT International Trading Pte Ltd, the
Court of Appeal tentatively expressed a preference for the view that the same
principles ought to apply to negotiated and non-negotiated choice of court agree-
ments.85 Vinmar was a case on exclusive choice of court agreements. The Court of
Appeal in Shanghai Turbo declined to decide if the waiver of objection to the
exercise of jurisdiction of the Singapore courts should similarly be presumed if the
optional choice of court agreement was not freely negotiated.86 However, the court
held that if the optional choice of court agreement is for a foreign court, the weight to
be attributed to the agreement would depend on circumstances of the case, such as
whether the agreement was part of a closely negotiated contract or was a standard
term in a contract of adhesion.87
2.7 Proceedings Brought in a Non-chosen Court
If proceedings are brought in Singapore when there exists an optional choice of court
agreement for another court, the defendant may apply for a stay of the proceedings.
Outside the context of the SICC, the test of forum non conveniens set out in
Spiliada88 will apply. It comprises of two stages. The defendant must show that
there is another court which is clearly or distinctly more appropriate than Singapore
for trial of the action in the ﬁrst stage. Under this ﬁrst stage, factors such as the
residence of the parties, the locations of relevant witnesses, facts and evidence, and
governing law of the dispute will be considered.89 The possibility of a transfer of the
case from the Singapore High Court to the SICC is also a relevant factor, as certain
characteristics of the SICC may render Singapore a more appropriate forum com-
pared to a foreign forum.90 Further, as mentioned above, the Singapore courts tend to
treat an optional choice of court agreement as a factor in the Spiliada analysis and the
weight to be attributed to the agreement would depend on whether it was part of a
negotiated contract or a contract of adhesion. The search is for the forum to which
the action has the most real and substantial connection, although the concept of the
natural forum is a relative one.91 If the defendant discharges this burden, ordinarily a
85[2018] 2 SLR 1271, [138].
86[2019] 1 SLR 779, [90]. The clause on the facts appeared to have been freely negotiated. Cf. Hii
Yii Ann [2014] 4 SLR 1042, [51].
87[2019] 1 SLR 779, [88].
88[1987] AC 460.
89JIO Minerals FZC v Mineral Enterprises Ltd [2011] 1 SLR 391, [41]–[42].
90Rappo, Tania v Accent Delight International Ltd [2017] 2 SLR 265.
91
“The search is for a natural forum, not the natural forum”: Yeo (2009), para 75.089, cited in JIO
Minerals FZC v Mineral Enterprises Ltd [2011] 1 SLR 391, [53].
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stay will be granted unless the plaintiff shows that there are circumstances by reason
of which justice requires that a stay should nevertheless be refused. All circum-
stances of the case will be considered in the second stage.92
The SICC may hear a case which has been transferred to it by the Singapore High
Court.93 In this situation, the SICC may not reconsider whether it has jurisdiction.94
Anti-suit injunctions are part of the Singapore court’s litigation toolbox. The anti-
suit injunction will only be granted where the “ends of justice” require it and the
jurisdiction is one which must be exercised with caution lest comity be infringed.95
The court, in considering whether to grant an anti-suit injunction, will consider the
following elements96:
(a) whether the defendants are amenable to the jurisdiction of the Singapore court;
(b) the natural forum for resolution of the dispute between the parties;
(c) the alleged vexation or oppression to the plaintiffs if the foreign proceedings are
to continue;
(d) the alleged injustice to the defendants as an injunction would deprive the
defendants of the advantages sought in the foreign proceedings; and
(e) whether the institution of the foreign proceedings is in breach of any agreement
between the parties.
In the speciﬁc context of an application for an anti-suit injunction to restrain
foreign proceedings commenced in breach of an agreement between the parties, it
has been held that the anti-suit injunction would be granted unless there are strong
reasons not to and that there would be no need for the applicant to put forward
additional evidence of unconscionable conduct.97 The court need not feel any
difﬁdence in granting the anti-suit injunction if it is sought promptly and the foreign
proceedings are not too far advanced.98 Comity considerations would militate
92Eng Liat Kiang v Eng Bak Hern [1995] 2 SLR(R) 851, [19].
93Rules of Court, Order 110, rule 7(2).
94Rules of Court, Order 110, rule 12(5)(a). This provides that where a case is transferred, “the court
to which the case is transferred must not reconsider whether it has jurisdiction”. On the one hand,
the original text read: “the court to which the case is transferred must not reconsider whether it has
or will assume jurisdiction” (emphasis added). The omission of the italicised words in the amended
text (2016 amendment) suggests that the SICC retains the discretion to examine the exercise of
jurisdiction. On the other hand, the wording of Order 110, rule 8(1), which sets out the ‘not
appropriate’ forum test as the test for exercise of jurisdiction by the SICC was recently amended
to be “[s]ubject to . . . Rule 12(5)(a)” (2018 amendment). On policy grounds, a prohibition on a
review of both existence and exercise of jurisdiction in a transfer case would be sound.
95John Reginald Stott Kirkham v Trane US Inc [2009] 4 SLR(R) 428, [25], citing Société Nationale
Industrielle Aerospatiale v Lee Kui Jak [1987] AC 871, 892.
96John Reginald Stott Kirkham v Trane US Inc [2009] 4 SLR(R) 428, [28]–[29].
97Sun Travels & Tours Pvt Ltd v Hilton International Manage (Maldives) Pvt Ltd [2019] 1 SLR
732, [68].
98Sun Travels & Tours Pvt Ltd v Hilton International Manage (Maldives) Pvt Ltd [2019] 1 SLR
732, [68].
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against grant of the anti-suit injunction the longer the delay and the more advanced
the foreign court proceedings are.99
The mere commencement of foreign proceedings where there is an optional
choice of court agreement for Singapore does not engage element (e) above. The
Singapore High Court inUBS AG v Telesto Investments Ltd100 held that there was no
breach when the defendants commenced proceedings abroad.101 There is no pre-
sumption that a multiplicity of proceedings is vexatious and the burden will be on the
applicant to demonstrate a reason which is independent of the optional choice of
court agreement that the foreign proceedings are vexatious or oppressive.102 The fact
that no substantive proceedings have been commenced in Singapore would be a
factor militating against the grant of the anti-suit injunction.103 However, if the
plaintiff applies for an anti-anti-suit injunction to restrain the defendant from apply-
ing for an anti-suit injunction restraining the plaintiff from commencing Singapore
proceedings, the plaintiff need not show that the foreign proceedings are vexatious or
oppressive. Instead, the burden will be on the defendant to show strong reasons why
the anti-anti-suit injunction should not be granted.
In Sun Travels & Tours Pvt Ltv v Hilton International Manage (Maldives) Pvt
Ltd,104 the Court of Appeal considered if an anti-enforcement injunction ought to be
granted to restrain a Maldivian judgment procured in breach of an arbitration
agreement. Mindful that the effect of such an injunction would be akin to nullifying
the foreign judgment, the court held that anti-enforcement injunctions would only be
granted in exceptional circumstances that warrant the injunction.105 This must be
over and above the usual requirements for the grant of an anti-suit injunction.106 The
idea of exceptional circumstances was to be tied to the notion of unconscionabil-
ity.107 The court gave two examples where an anti-enforcement injunction may be
warranted: fraud by the other party and when the applicant had no knowledge of the
foreign proceedings until the judgment was rendered.108
Under the Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (“REFJA”),109 a
foreign judgment which is handed down in breach of a choice of court agreement in
99Sun Travels & Tours Pvt Ltd v Hilton International Manage (Maldives) Pvt Ltd [2019] 1 SLR
732, [82]–[83].
100UBS AG v Telesto Investments Ltd [2011] 4 SLR 503.
101The reasoning used by the court in UBS, [2011] 4 SLR 503, [120], which was that to hold
otherwise would render the distinction between exclusive and optional choice of court agreements
illusory, is no longer good law after Shanghai Turbo. The principle remains untouched by Shanghai
Turbo.
102UBS AG v Telesto Investments Ltd [2011] 4 SLR 503, [119].
103Morgan Stanley Asia (Singapore) Pte (formerly known as Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Asia
(Singapore) Pte) v Hong Leong Finance Ltd [2013] 3 SLR 409, [71].
104[2019] 1 SLR 732.
105[2019] 1 SLR 732, [98]–[99].
106[2019] 1 SLR 732. [99].
107[2019] 1 SLR 732, [105].
108[2019] 1 SLR 732, [113].
109Cap 265, 2001 Rev Ed.
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favour of a court other than that which rendered judgment would be refused
enforcement.110 This would be relevant provided that an optional choice of court
agreement can be construed to contain a promise not to sue in other courts. The
REFJA is to date restricted to judgments handed down from the courts of Hong
Kong SAR. Outside of this context, there is no prohibition against recognising and
enforcing a foreign judgment merely because it was handed down by a court other
than that which was nominated in an optional choice of court agreement.
In Tradewaves Ltd v Standard Chartered Bank,111 the Singapore court was open
to the idea of awarding damages for breach of contract where one party commences
proceedings in a court other than that named in an exclusive choice of court
agreement. It cited the English Court of Appeal decision of Union Discount v
Zoller,112 where the court held that “unusual features” would entitle the plaintiff to
an award of damages for breach of an exclusive choice of court agreement. The
“unusual features” include where the rules of the foreign court only permitted the
recovery of costs in exceptional circumstances and the foreign court had made no
adjudication on costs. As no evidence on any exceptional feature had been led, the
court in Tradewaves dismissed the claim for damages for breach of the exclusive
choice of court agreement.113 The Singapore courts have not considered the same
issue in relation to a breach of an optional choice of court agreement, but it stands to
reason that the contractual approach post-Shanghai Turbo would allow for it.
3 Exclusive Choice of Court Agreements
An exclusive choice of court agreement is considered to have both prorogative and
derogative effects. Optional choice of court agreements are generally considered
only to have a prorogative effect, although it has been seen above that the agreement
may sometimes be construed to have a greater effect than this. Different tests on the
exercise of a court’s jurisdiction apply depending on whether an agreement is
considered to play both prorogative and derogative functions, and when it is
considered to play only a prorogative function.
Outside the context of the SICC and the CCAA, a party who seeks to bring an
action in Singapore in breach of an exclusive choice of court agreement for another
court must show exceptional circumstances amounting to “strong cause” why the
court should exercise its discretion to assist him.114 A party who seeks a stay of
110S 5(3)(b). Unless the judgment debtor submitted to that court’s jurisdiction.
111[2017] SGHC 93.
112[2002] 1 WLR 1517.
113[2017] SGHC 93, [293].
114The “Jian He” [1999] 3 SLR(R) 432; Golden Shore Transportation Pte Ltd v UCO Bank [2004]
1 SLR(R) 6.
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Singaporean proceedings which are commenced pursuant to an exclusive choice of
court agreement for Singapore is also put to the same standard. Similarly, if pro-
ceedings are commenced in Singapore pursuant to an exclusive choice of court
agreement for Singapore, a defendant who applies to set aside service of the writ on
him abroad will have to fulﬁl the “strong cause” test. The starting point in all these
cases is that the contractual bargain must be upheld. The “strong cause” test has been
elaborated on above.115 Further, comity considerations are less relevant when an
anti-suit injunction to restrain foreign proceedings brought in breach of a Singapore
exclusive choice of court agreement is sought,116 provided that there is no delay in
bringing the application for anti-suit relief.117
Once an agreement has been identiﬁed as being exclusive in nature, its legal effect
and the relevant test to be applied to the court’s exercise of jurisdiction are clear
whether the agreement is for the Singapore court or a foreign court. The only
difference is on whom the burden of proof lies. The legal effect of optional choice
of court agreements, outside the context of the SICC, would depend on whether the
named court is the Singapore court or a foreign court.
In the speciﬁc context of proceedings before the SICC,118 if the SICC assumed
jurisdiction on the basis of an exclusive choice of court agreement in its favour, the
applicable test when considering whether it ought to decline jurisdiction is the “not
appropriate” forum test.119 If the case has been transferred to the SICC from the High
Court120 in circumstances where the commencement of the High Court action was in
breach of an exclusive choice of court agreement for a foreign court, the SICC may
not reconsider whether it has jurisdiction.121
The CCAA enacts the HCCCA into Singapore law. It only applies in international
cases122 to exclusive choice of court agreements123 in favour of the courts of
Contracting States to the HCCCA in civil and commercial matters.124 If Singapore
is the exclusively chosen forum, it must hear the case unless the choice of court
agreement is null and void under Singapore law.125 Notably, discretionary tests such
as forum non conveniens and “strong cause” are precluded under the CCAA.126
115See text to n 53–62.
116John Reginald Stott Kirkham v Trane US Inc [2009] 4 SLR(R) 428, [29]; UBS AG v Telesto
Investments Ltd [2011] 4 SLR 503, [109].
117Sun Travels & Tours Pvt Ltd v Hilton International Manage (Maldives) Pvt Ltd [2019] 1 SLR
732, [81].
118The presumptions which apply when there is a choice of court agreement for the SICC have been
set out above, text to n 19 above.
119Rules of Court, Order 110, rule 8(1). See above, text to n 67–70.
120Rules of Court, Order 110, rules 7(2), 12(3B) and 12(4).
121See n 94 above.
122Deﬁned in CCAA, s 4.
123Deﬁned in CCAA, s 3.
124A list of matters excluded from the Act are set out in CCAA, s 9.
125CCAA, s 11(1).
126Hartley and Dogauchi (2005) (“Hartley and Dogauchi Report”), paras 132 and 134.
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However, if the defendant is abroad and the case is commenced in the Singapore
High Court, leave127 is still ostensibly required to serve the writ on the defendant
although the court is obliged to hear the case. Formally, this can be considered to be
anomalous, although in practical terms, leave is usually granted readily even in a
non-CCAA case where there is a choice of court agreement for Singapore.
If the parties have chosen a speciﬁc court in Singapore in their agreement, the
chosen court retains the discretion to transfer the case to another Singapore court
pursuant to its internal allocation of jurisdiction rules.128
If another Contracting State court to the HCCCA is the exclusively chosen forum,
the Singapore court must stay or dismiss the action before it unless one of the
following exceptions set out in section 12(1) of the CCAA applies:
(a) the agreement is null and void under the law of the State of the chosen court;
(b) a party to the agreement lacked capacity, under the law of Singapore, to enter into or
conclude the agreement;
(c) giving effect to the agreement would lead to a manifest injustice or would be manifestly
contrary to the public policy of Singapore;
(d) for exceptional reasons beyond the control of the parties to the agreement, the agreement
cannot reasonably be performed; or
(e) the chosen court has decided not to hear the case or proceeding.
4 Asymmetrical Choice of Court Agreements
There appear to be few reported cases dealing expressly with asymmetrical choice of
court agreements and of those few, the optional portion of such agreements has not
been at issue. In view of the Singapore court’s approach towards optional choice of
court agreements in general, it seems safe to conclude that the court will enforce the
optional portion of the agreement.
In TMT Co Ltd v The Royal Bank of Scotland,129 the clause provided for disputes
to be subject to the jurisdiction of the English courts for the defendants’ beneﬁt, and
further provided that the defendants shall not be prevented from seising the courts of
any other competent jurisdiction. The plaintiffs commenced proceedings in England;
these proceedings culminated in a settlement agreement. The plaintiffs thereafter
commenced proceedings in Singapore. The defendants applied to set aside service of
the writ out of the jurisdiction. In determining this application, the Singapore High
Court carefully construed the agreement to determine whether the dispute at hand
fell within its scope, and the obligations which it imposed on the plaintiff in respect
of the disputes. It then applied the Spiliada test and concluded that Singapore was
forum non conveniens. The asymmetric choice of court agreement did not feature in
127Pursuant to Rules of Court, Order 11.
128CCAA, s 11(5): however, “the chosen court must, before exercising that discretion, take into
account the parties’ choice of court.”
129[2018] 3 SLR 70.
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the Spiliada analysis, but this may have been because the claim involved several
defendants, not all of whom were a party to that agreement.
The judgment in Bayerische Landesbank Girozentrale v Kong Kok Keong130 is
inconclusive as to the relevant test that applies when the jurisdiction of the court is
contested. The agreement in Bayerische provided for the defendant borrower to
submit to the jurisdiction of the Singapore courts, but for the plaintiff bank to retain
the right to commence proceedings in the courts of any other country. The Singapore
High Court referred to authorities on “strong cause” as well as Spiliada, appearing in
the end to apply the latter principles in the stay application.131 One of the main
factors relied on by the court when refusing to stay its proceedings was that the
parties had expressly submitted to the Singapore court’s jurisdiction.132
The effect of asymmetrical choice of court agreements does not depend on the
relative bargaining strength of the parties. The courts have enforced asymmetrical
agreements which favour banks as against borrowers. The only caveat is that the
agreements are entered into freely between the parties.133
Lastly, it should be noted that the Hartley and Dogauchi Report states that
asymmetrical choice of court agreements do not fall within the scope of the
HCCCA as they are not exclusive for the purposes of the HCCCA.134 The English
High Court decision of Commerzbank AG v Liquimar Tankers Management Inc135
has thrown some doubt on this proposition. It is unlikely that the Singapore court
would follow Commerzbank; in the one case to be decided to date under the CCAA,
the court quoted copiously from the Hartley and Dogauchi Report.136 In addition, as
a matter of principle, the Hartley and Dogauchi Report ought to be considered
authoritative in relation to the interpretation of the HCCCA to ensure a degree of
uniformity of application amongst Contracting States.
5 Evaluation and Reform
It can be seen from the above that Singapore law places great emphasis on giving
effect to party autonomy. To that end, optional choice of court agreements are
enforceable, and at common law, Singapore courts will construe the agreement in
accordance with the proper law of the contract to determine its legal effect.
If Singapore law were to be the proper law of the contract, a presumption that the
parties have waived their right to object to the exercise of jurisdiction will be read
130[2002] 1 SLR(R) 485. The court did not refer to its asymmetry as being a special feature and the
agreement was dealt with on the basis that it was like any other optional choice of court agreement.
131Cf. Lee (2003), pp. 598–599, who is of the view that the court applied the test of “strong cause”.
132[2002] 1 SLR(R) 485, [14].
133TMT Co Ltd v The Royal Bank of Scotland plc [2018] 3 SLR 70, [74].
134Hartley and Dogauchi Report, paras 32, 105–106 and 249.
135[2017] EWHC 161 (Comm), [2017] 1 WLR 3497, [74].
136Ermgassen & Co Ltd v Sixcap Financials Pte Ltd [2018] SGHCR 8.
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into the agreement if Singapore is the, or a, named forum. The Shanghai Turbo
approach means that the distinction between exclusive and optional choice of court
agreements for the Singapore court is abrogated. It also has the effect that forum and
foreign optional choice of court agreements are treated differently, with the former
having greater legal effect. This has unwelcome overtones of parochialism. That
said, the decision is in line with the use of the presumption of exclusivity under the
SICC’s rules and the CCAA. The use of the presumption of exclusivity may mean
that some agreements which were intended, but not adequately expressed, to be
optional in nature would be treated as exclusive choice of court agreements. The
overall net effect of the recent common law and legislative developments is to
encourage the Singapore courts to exercise jurisdiction. This can be seen as a
manifestation of the desire to position Singapore as an international dispute resolu-
tion hub. Moving forward, parties to a contract should be careful to make explicit
their speciﬁc intentions whenever they agree on an optional choice of court agree-
ment as a failure to do so may have an unintended effect.
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